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Abstract
Pre-trained Transformer-based neural architec-
tures have consistently achieved state-of-the-
art performance in the Natural Language Infer-
ence (NLI) task. Since NLI examples encom-
pass a variety of linguistic, logical, and reason-
ing phenomena, it remains unclear as to which
specific concepts are learnt by the trained sys-
tems and where they can achieve strong gener-
alization. To investigate this question, we pro-
pose a taxonomic hierarchy of categories that
are relevant for the NLI task. We introduce
TAXINLI, a new dataset, that has 10k exam-
ples from the MNLI dataset (Williams et al.,
2018) with these taxonomic labels. Through
various experiments on TAXINLI, we observe
that whereas for certain taxonomic categories
SOTA neural models have achieved near per-
fect accuracies—a large jump over the previ-
ous models—some categories still remain diffi-
cult. Our work adds to the growing body of lit-
erature that shows the gaps in the current NLI
systems and datasets through a systematic pre-
sentation and analysis of reasoning categories.
1 Introduction
The Natural Language Inference (NLI) task tests
whether a hypothesis (H) in text contradicts with,
is entailed by, or is neutral with respect to a given
premise (P) text. This 3-way classification task,
popularized by Bowman et al. (2015), which was in
turn inspired by Dagan et al. (2005), now serves as
a benchmark for evaluation of natural language un-
derstanding (NLU) capability of models; for exam-
ple, NLI datasets (Bowman et al., 2015; Williams
et al., 2018) are included in all NLU benchmarks
such as GLUE and SuperGLUE (Wang et al., 2018).
These corpora, in turn, have been successfully
used to train models such as BERT (Devlin et al.,
† denotes equal contribution. ∗Work was done while
Authors were at Microsoft Research India.
2019) to achieve state-of-the-art (SOTA) perfor-
mance in these tasks. Despite the wide adoption of
NLI datasets, a growing concern in the community
has been the lack of clarity as to which linguistic
or reasoning concepts these trained NLI systems
are truly able to learn and generalize (see, for
example (Linzen, 2020) and (Bender and Koller,
2020), for a discussion). Over the years, as mod-
els have shown steady performance increases in
NLI tasks, many authors (Nie et al., 2019; Kaushik
et al., 2019) demonstrate steep drops in perfor-
mance when these models are tested against ad-
versarially (or counterfactually) created examples
by non-experts. Richardson et al. (2019) use tem-
plated examples to show trained NLI systems fail to
capture essential logical (negation, boolean, quan-
tifier) and semantic (monotonicity) phenomena.
Herein lie the central questions of our work: 1)
what is the distribution of various categories of
reasoning tasks in the NLI datasets? 2) which
categories of tasks are rarely captured by current
NLI datasets (owing to the nature of the task and
the non-expert annotators)? 3) which categories
are well-understood by the SOTA models? and
4) are there categories where Transformer-based
architectures are consistently deficient?
In order to answer these questions, we first dis-
cuss why performance-specific error analysis cat-
egories (Wang et al., 2018; Nie et al., 2019), and
stress testing categories (Naik et al., 2018) are inad-
equate. We then propose a taxonomy of the various
reasoning tasks that are commonly covered by the
current NLI datasets (Sec 2). Next, we annotate
10,071 P-H pairs from the MNLI dataset (Williams
et al., 2018) with the lowest level taxonomic cate-
gories, 18 in total (Sec 3). Then we conduct various
experiments and careful error analysis of the SOTA
models—BERT and RoBERTa, as well as other
baselines, such as Bag-of-words Naı¨ve Bayes and
ESIM, on their performance across these categories
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
14
50
5v
3 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 9 
Oc
t 2
02
0
(Sec 4). Our analyses indicate that while these mod-
els perform well on some categories such as lin-
guistic reasoning, the performance on many other
categories, such as those that require world knowl-
edge or temporal reasoning, are quite poor. We
also look into the embeddings of the P-H pairs to
understand which of these categorical distinctions
are captured well in the learnt representations, and
which get conflated (Sec 5). Inline with our previ-
ous finding, we observe strong correlation between
the level of clustering within the representation of
the examples from a category, and the performance
of the models for that particular category.
2 A New Taxonomy for NLI
2.1 Necessity for a New Taxonomy
According to Wittgenstein (1922), “Language dis-
guises the thought”, and human beings try to gauge
such thought from colloquial language using “com-
plex silent adjustments”. The journey from lexicon
and syntax of “language” to the aspects of seman-
tics and pragmatics can be thought of as a journey
that portrays important milestones that an ideal
NLU system should achieve. Irrespective of the or-
der of such milestones1, we believe that NLU (and
NLI) systems should be tested and analyzed with
respect to fundamental linguistic and logical phe-
nomena. Recently, different types of phenomena
have been tested through 1) creating new datasets,
2) probing tasks, and 3) error-analysis categoriza-
tions. Researchers have created new datasets by
recasting various NLU tasks to a large NLI dataset
(Poliak et al., 2018), eliciting counter-factual exam-
ples from non-experts by considering different lexi-
cal and reasoning factors (Kaushik et al., 2019), and
adversarial example (Nie et al., 2019) elicitation by
letting non-experts come up with examples through
interacting with SOTA systems. However, these
datasets do not expose the linguistic aspects where
the current systems have difficulty. Using the prob-
ing task methodology, researchers (Jawahar et al.,
2019; Goldberg, 2019) observed that BERT cap-
tures syntactic structure, along with some seman-
tics such as NER, and semantic role labels (Tenney
et al., 2019b). However, BERT’s ability to reason is
questioned by the observed performance degrada-
tion in MNLI (McCoy et al., 2019). Linzen (2020)
also called for a pretraining-agnostic evaluation
setup, where the setup is not limited to pre-trained
1“For an infant, a foreigner, or an instant-message addict,
context is more important than syntax” (Sowa, 2010).
Figure 1: Taxonomic Categorization of the NLI task.
language models. Our taxonomic categorization
is meant to serve as a set of necessary inferenc-
ing capabilities that one would expect a competing
NLI system to possess; thereby promoting more
probing tasks along unexplored categories.
Existing categorization efforts have centred
around informing feature creation in the pre-
Transformer era, and model-specific error analysis
in more recent times. Previously, (LoBue and Yates,
2011) enumerated the type of commonsense knowl-
edge required for NLI. Among recent error analysis
efforts, the GLUE diagnostic dataset (Wang et al.,
2018), inference types for Adversarial NLI (Nie
et al., 2019), the new CheckList (Ribeiro et al.,
2020) system and the Stress Tests (Naik et al.,
2018) are mentionworthy. As we attempted to
group the categorizations in Nie et al. (2019) and
Wang et al. (2018) into four high-level categories
(lexical, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic)2, we
observe that there is a lack of consensus, non-
uniformity and repetitiveness of these categories.
For example, the Tricky label in Nie et al. (2019)
groups examples that involve “wordplay, linguis-
tic strategies such as syntactic transformations, or
inferring writer intentions from contexts”; thereby
spanning aspects of syntax and pragmatics. Simi-
larly, Reference and Names requires both reasoning
and knowledge. The GLUE diagnostic categories
(Wang et al., 2018) does not include interesting
reasoning categories such as temporal, and spatial.
The stress types proposed by Naik et al. (2018) are
specific to mostly lexical and some semantic corner
cases. This is expected, as these categorizations are
analysis-oriented and often dependent on the per-
formance of a set of models in question. Here, we
propose a taxonomic categorization that delineates
2Table provided in Appendix
a set of necessary uniform inferencing capabilities
for the NLI task.
2.2 Taxonomic Categories: Definitions and
Examples
In Figure 1, we present our taxonomic categoriza-
tion. Our categorization is based on the follow-
ing principles. First, we take a model-agnostic ap-
proach, where we work from the first principles to
arrive at a set of basic inferencing processes that are
required in NLI task. These include an unrestricted
variety of linguistic and logical phenomena, and
may require knowledge beyond text, thus provid-
ing us with the higher-level categories: linguistic,
logical and knowledge-based. Second, we retain
categories that are non-overlapping and sufficiently
represented in NLI datasets. For example, for sub-
categories under linguistic, we prune semantics be-
cause necessary aspects are covered by logical
and knowledge-based categories. We omit spe-
cific aspects of pragmatics such as implicatures
and pre-suppositions, as they are rarely observed in
NLI datasets (Jeretic et al., 2020). Thirdly, we aim
to list a set of necessary sub-categories. For exam-
ple, for logical deduction sub-categories, we take
inspiration from Davis and Marcus (2015), who
list the commonsense reasoning categories where
systems have seen success. Lastly, since we aim to
employ non-experts for collecting annotations, we
decide to restrict further sub-division wherever the
definitions get complicated, or pre-suppose certain
expertise; for example the lexical category is
not sub-divided further (as followed in Wang et al.
(2018)). Thus, we take a pragmatic approach that
is theory neutral and does not warrant coverage
of all reasoning tasks, though we do believe that
the taxonomy is sufficiently deep and generic that
allows systematic and meaningful analysis of NLI
models with respect to their reasoning capabilities.
Next we define the categories. For a full set of
examples, please see Table 1.
High-Level Categories: The Linguistic cat-
egory represents NLI examples where the infer-
ence process to determine the entailment are inter-
nal to the provided text. We classify examples as
Logical when the inference process may involve
processes external to text, such as mapping words
to percepts and reason with them (Sowa, 2010).
Knowledge-based category represents examples
where some form of external, domain or commonly
assumed knowledge is required for inferencing.
Linguistic category is further sub-divided
into lexical, syntactic, and factivity.
1. Lexical: This category captures P-H pairs where
the text is almost the same apart from removal,
addition or substitution of some lexical items. Ex-
ample: P: Anakin was kind. H: Anakin was cruel.
2. Syntactic: Syntactic deals with examples
where syntactic variations or paraphrases are essen-
tial to detecting entailment. Example: P: Anakin
was an excellent pilot. H: The piloting skills of
Anakin were excellent.
3. Factivity: Here the hypothesis contains an as-
sumed fact from the premise, mostly an assumption
about the existence of an entity or the occurrence
of an action (inspired from Wang et al. (2018)).
Example: P: Padme recognized that Anakin was
intelligent. H: Anakin was intelligent.
Based on commonalities, Logical categories
are grouped under “Connectives”. “Mathematical”
and “Deduction”.
1. Connectives (Negation, Boolean, Quantifiers,
Conditionals, Comparatives): We group the
logical categories negation, boolean,
quantifier, conditional and
comparative (Salvatore et al., 2019) un-
der the “Connectives” label. Negation applies
when P negates one (or more) of the facts in H.
We apply the category boolean when P is a set
of statements connected by or, and and H talks
about one of the statements. Quantifier is
applied when P or H requires understanding of
words denoting existential or universal quantifiers.
Similarly, conditional is applicable where
P or H has conditional statements. If P (or
H) compares entities via comparative phrases,
then we label it as comparative. Examples:
(boolean and negation) P: Jar Jar, R2D2 and
Padme only visited Anakin’s house. H: Jar Jar
Binks didn’t visit Anakin’s shop.
2. Mathematical (Counting, Arithmetic): This
group of categories is concerned with examples
that require mathematical reasoning. For brevity,
we concentrate on examples that require counting
and simple arithmetic operations. However, we
observed exceedingly low number of examples in
this category group from our pilot study on SNLI
and MNLI, and hence we remove these from our
final annotations.
3. Deductions (Relational, Spatial, Temporal,
Causal, Coreference): Motivated by predicate
logic, success of qualitative representation and
Taxonomic
Category
MNLI Examples Taxonomic
Category
MNLI Examples
Lexical
P: so it’s stayed cold for the entire week
H: It has been cold for the whole week.
Relational
P: Actually, my sister wrote a story on it.
H: My sibling created a story about it.
Syntactic
P: Those in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen were
eventually overthrown by secular nationalist revolutionaries.
H: Secular nationalist revolutionaries eventually
overthrew them in Egypt and Libya.
Spatial
P: At the eastern end of Back Lane and turning right,
Nicholas Street becomes Patrick Street, and in St. Patrick’s
Close is St. Patrick’s Cathedral .
H: Nicholas Street becomes Patrick Street after
turning left at the eastern end of Back Lane.
Factivity
P: The best place to view the spring azaleas is at the Azalea Festival
in the last week of April at Tokyo’s Nezu shrine.
H:There is an Azalea Festival at the Nezu Shrine.
Temporal
P: See you Aug. 12, or soon thereafter, we hope.
H: The person told not to come until December.
Negation
P: They post loads of newspaper articles–Yahoo!
H: Yahoo does not post any articles from newspapers.
Causal
P: Acroseon the mountainside is another terrace on which
imperial courtiers and dignitaries would sit while
enjoying dance performances and music recitals on the
hondo’s broad terrace.
H: There is a terrace where musicians play.
Boolean
P:According to contemporaneous notes, at 9:55 the Vice President
was still on the phone with the President advising that three planes
were missing and one had hit the Pentagon.
H: The President called the Vice President to tell him the plane
hit the Pentagon.
Coreference
P: A dozen minor wounds crossed his forearms and body.
H: The grenade explosion left him with a lot of wounds.
Quantifier
P: Some travelers add Molokai and Lanai to their itineraries.
H: No one decides to go to Molokai and Lanai.
World
P: In this respect, bringing Steve Jobs back to save Apple
is like bringing Gen.
H: Steve Jobs unretired in 2002.
Conditional
P: If the revenue is transferred to the General Fund, it is recognized
as nonexchange revenue in the Government-wide consolidated
financial statements.
H: Revenue from the General Fund is not considered in financial statements
Taxonomic
P: Benson’s action picture in Lucia in London
(Chapter 8)- Georgie stepped on a beautiful pansy.
H: Georgie crushed a beautiful flower in Chapter 8
of Lucia in London.
Comparative
P: Load time is divided into elemental and coverage related load time.
H: The coverage related load time is longer than elemental.
Table 1: For each category, we provide an example from the MNLI dataset. For a full set of synthetic examples
and definitions, please look at appendix.
reasoning in dealing with temporal and spatial
reasoning (Gabelaia et al., 2005), and causality
(Pearl, 2009), we list relational, temporal,
spatial and causal under “Deductions”.
The relational reasoning stands for the
requirement to perform deductive reasoning
using relations present in text. Spatial (and
temporal) denotes reasoning using spatial (and
temporal) properties of objects represented in text.
We also consider language-inspired reasoning
categories such as co-reference resolution, which
is known to often require event-understanding
(Ng, 2017) beyond superficial cues. Example:
(relational) P: The lamp was working
properly. H: The lightbulb from the lamp was not
functioning.
Lastly, we define two sub-categories under
Knowledge, namely world and taxonomic.
1. World: Examples that require knowledge about
named entities, knowledge about historical, current
events; and domain-specific knowledge. Example:
(world) P: Michelle Obama stayed in the White
House during 2009-17. H: Michelle was living in
the White House legally during 2009.
2. Taxonomic: Examples that require taxonomies
and hierarchies. For example, IsA, hasA, hasProp-
erty relations. Example: (taxonomic) P: Nor-
man hated all musical instruments. H: Norman
loves the piano.
Note that presence of a certain lexical trigger for
a category (such as negation) does not warrant the
labeling with the category, unless understanding of
that concept is invoked in the deduction process.
3 TaxiNLI: Dataset Details
We present TaxiNLI, a dataset collected based on
the principles and categorizations of the aforemen-
tioned taxonomy. We curate a subset of examples
from MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) by sampling
uniformly based on the entailment label and the
domain. We then annotate this dataset with fine-
grained category labels.
3.1 Annotation Process
Task Design For large-scale data collection, our
aim was to propose an annotation methodology that
is relatively flexible in terms of annotator qualifi-
cations, and yet results in high quality annotations.
To employ non-expert annotators, we designed a
simplified guideline (questionnaire/interface) for
the task, that does not pre-suppose expertise in
language or logic. As an overhead, the guideline
requires a few rounds of one-on-one training of
the annotators. Because it is expensive to perform
such rounds of training in most crowdsourcing plat-
forms, we hire and individually train a few cho-
sen annotators. Upon conducting the previously-
discussed pilot study and using the given feedback,
we created a hierarchical questionnaire which first
asked the annotator to do the NLI inference on the
P-H pair, and then asked targeted questions to get
the desired category annotations for the datapoints.
The questionnaire is shared in the Appendix.
For the MNLI datapoints with ‘neutral’ gold la-
bels, we realized, through observation and annota-
tor feedback, that annotating the categories were
difficult, as sometimes the hypotheses could not
be connected well back to their premise. Hence,
we created 2 questionnaires, one for the ‘entail-
ment/contradiction’ examples, and one for ‘neutral’
examples. For the entailment/contradiction exam-
ples, We collected binary annotations for each of
the 15 categories in our NLI taxonomy, for data-
points in MNLI which had ‘entailment’ or ‘contra-
diction’ as gold labels. To resolve this, for the ‘neu-
tral’ examples we specifically asked them whether
the premise and hypothesis were discussing 1) the
same general topic (politics, geology, etc.), and if
so, 2) had the same subject and/or object of discus-
sion (Obama, Taj Mahal, etc.). If the response to
2) was ‘yes’, then they were asked to provide the
category annotations as previously defined.
Annotator Training/Testing We first tested our
two annotators by asking them to do inference on a
set of randomly selected premise-hypothesis pairs
from MultiNLI. This was to familiarize them with
the inference task. After giving the category anno-
tation task, we also continuously tested and trained
the two annotators. After a set of datapoints were
annotated, we reviewed and went through clarifica-
tion and feedback sessions with the annotators to
ensure they understood the task, and the categories,
and what improvements were required. More de-
tails are provided in the Appendix.
3.1.1 Annotation Metrics
Here, we assess the individual annotator perfor-
mance and inter-annotator agreement. Since, au-
tomated metrics for individual complex category
annotations are hard to define, we use an indicative
metric that matches the annotated inference label
with the gold label, i.e., their inference accuracy.
We also calculated inter-annotator agreement be-
tween the two annotators for an overlapping subset
of 600 examples. For agreement, we use the Fleiss’
Kappa (κ) (Fleiss, 1971). We also compute another
simple statistic, namely the ‘IOU’ (Intersection-
Over-Union) of categories per datapoint, defined
as: IOU = 1N
∑N
i=1
|CiA1∩CiA2|
|CiA1∪CiA2|
, where CjAi are the
Figure 2: Inter-annotator Agreement (IAA) values be-
tween the two annotators, plotted category-wise.
category annotations for Annotator i for datapoint
j, averaged over total datapoints N . Looking at
the category-wise Fleiss’ κ values in Fig. 2, we
observe that there are promising levels of agree-
ment in most of the categories except syntactic,
relational, and world. We observe the av-
erage inference accuracy (86.7%) is high despite
known issues in MNLI example ambiguity. Sim-
ilarly, both the average Fleiss’ κ (0.226) and the
IOU metric (0.241) suggest an overall reasonable
inter-annotator agreement.
3.2 Dataset Statistics
Each datapoint in TaxiNLI3 consists of a premise-
hypothesis pair, the entailment label, and binary
annotations for 18 features. 15 features correspond
to the 15 categories discussed in the taxonomy, and
3 additional features for the ‘neutral’ gold label dat-
apoints based on same general topic, same subject,
and same object. The statistics are listed in Tab. 2.
Total datapoints 10,071
Datapoints overlapping with MNLI
2343 (train)
7728 (dev)
Avg. datapoints per domain 1007.1
Datapoints per NLI label 3375 (C), 3201 (N), 3495 (E)
Avg. categories per datapoint 1.6
Neutral example characteristics
3087 (Same general topic),
2843 (Same object),
877 (Same subject)
Table 2: TaxiNLI Statistics
3The dataset is available for download from https://
github.com/microsoft/TaxiNLI.
Figure 3: The number of datapoints annotated with
each category, split by the gold label of the data-
points. For taxonomic, the gold label split is
9(E)/7(C)/3(N).
Categorical Observations From our annota-
tions, we observe that inferencing each MNLI ex-
ample requires about 2 categories. Fig. 3 shows the
distribution of categories in the TaxiNLI dataset.
We see that a large number of P-H pairs in MNLI
require lexical and syntactic knowledge
to make an inference; whereas the challenges of
relational, spatial, and taxonomic for
inference are not adequately represented. There is
a large proportion of examples in the syntactic
category which have the ‘entailment’ label, and a
large proportion of negation examples have the
‘contradiction’ label. Additionally, many ‘neutral’
examples were classified as requiring causal
knowledge. The feedback session with annotators
revealed that there were many ‘neutral’ examples
where the hypothesis was essentially an unverifi-
able intent or detail of a certain action mentioned in
the premise. An example is “P: Another influence
was that patrician politician Franklin Roosevelt,
who was, like John D. Rockefeller, the focus of
Nelson’s relentless sycophancy and black-belt bu-
reaucratic infighting. H: Nelson targeted Roosevelt
in order to gain political favor.”.
Categorical Correlations Fig. 4 shows correla-
tions among categories in our dataset. We ob-
serve that most categories show weak correla-
tion in the MNLI dataset, hinting at a possible
independence of categories with respect to each
other. Relatively stronger positive correlations
are seen between boolean-quantifier, and
boolean-comparative categories. We specif-
ically looked at the genre-wise split of datapoints
containing boolean-quantifier and saw that
nearly 25% of them came from the ‘telephone’
genre of MNLI. An example is “P: have that well
and it doesn’t seem like very many people uh are
really i mean there’s a lot of people that are on
death row but there’s not very many people that
actually um do get killed H: Most people on death
row end up living out their lives awaiting execu-
tion.”. Factivity, on the other hand, is neg-
atively correlated with almost all the other cate-
gories, except world, which means P-H pairs la-
beled with factivity typically have no other
categories marked.
Figure 4: The correlation matrix between the taxo-
nomic categories.
4 (Re)Evaluation of SOTA Models
We re-evaluate two Transformer-based and two
standard baseline machine learning models on
TAXINLI, under the lens of the taxonomic cate-
gories. As baselines, we choose BERT-base (De-
vlin et al., 2019), and RoBERTa-large (Liu et al.,
2019b) as two state-of-the-art NLI systems. For
our experiments, we use the pre-trained BERT-
base and RoBERTa models from HuggingFace’s
Transformers implementation (Wolf et al., 2019).
As pre-Transformer baselines, we use the bidirec-
tional LSTM-based Enhanced Sequential Inference
model (ESIM) (Chen et al., 2017). We also train a
Naive Bayes (NB) model using bag-of-words fea-
tures for the P-H pairs after removing stop words4.
4Using NLTK’s RTEFeatureExtractor
4.1 TAXINLI Error Analysis
We report the NLI task accuracy of the baseline
systems on the MNLI validations sets in Table 3.
The systems are fine-tuned on the MNLI training
set using the procedures followed in Devlin et al.
(2019); Liu et al. (2019b); Chen et al. (2017).
MNLI-dev NB ESIM BERTBASE RoBERTaLARGE
Matched 51.46 72.3 84.7 92.3
Mismatched 52.31 72.1 84.8 90.0
Table 3: MNLI-validation set accuracy.
We evaluate the systems on a total of 7.7k exam-
ples, which are in the intersection of TAXINLI and
the validation sets of MNLI.
Figure 5 shows for each category ci, the normal-
ized frequency for a model predicting an NLI exam-
ple of that category accurately, i.e., #ci=1,correct=1#ci=1 .
We observe that compared to NB, the improve-
ments in BERT have been higher in lexical,
syntactic categories compared to others. Im-
provements in ESIM compared to NB show a very
similar trend, and show for knowledge categories
the improvements are negligible. ESIM shows
largest improvement on negation.
Figure 5: The normalized frequency of the systems pre-
dicting an example correctly, provided a category.
4.2 Factor Analysis
In order to quantify the precise influence of the cat-
egory labels on the prediction of the NLI models,
we probe into indicators and confounding factors
using two methods: linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) and logistic regression (LR). We use indi-
cators for each category (0 or 1) and for two po-
tential confounding variables (lengths of P,H), to
model the correctness of prediction of the NLI sys-
tem. The coefficients of these analyses on BERT
are shown in Fig 6. The values for RoBERTa
Figure 6: Coefficients obtained through Linear Dis-
criminant Analysis (LDA) and Logistic Regression
(LR) to model the correctness of NLI prediction
by BERT, given taxonomy categories and possible
confound variables. Significant LR coefficients:
syntactic**, negation***, boolean*,
causal***, world***, Length2**; where p
value is smaller than: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*.
follow a similar trend, and are presented in the
appendix. We see that presence of certain taxo-
nomic categories strongly influence the correctness
of prediction. As we found in the analysis pre-
sented in Sec. 4, we observe that syntactic,
negation, and spatial categories are strong
indicators of correctness of prediction. On the other
hand, conditional, relational, causal,
coreference are harder to predict accurately.
Sentence length does not play a significant role.
We also make an observation for categories such
as lexical, syntactic, where the propor-
tion of a single NLI label is high, also correlated
with a high prediction accuracy (Fig. 6).
5 Discussion
Visual Analysis Section 4 paints a thorough pic-
ture by analysing the fine-grained capabilities of
SOTA NLI systems at a behavioral5 level. Whereas
we can say the systems are lacking in certain as-
pects despite their high overall performance, it nat-
urally also raises questions at the understanding
level: 1) Is there any implicit knowledge acquired
by the NLI-finetuned systems about the kinds of
reasoning required in the inference task? 2) If not,
5Similar to social sciences, as a black-box system
(a) Lexical coloured at
BERTBASE layer 3
(b) Connectives coloured at
BERTBASE layer 6
(c) Syntactic coloured at
BERTBASE layer 11
(d) Deductions coloured at
BERTBASE layer 12
(e) Lexical coloured at
RoBERTaLARGE layer 1
(f) Connectives coloured at
RoBERTaLARGE layer 19
(g) Knowledge coloured at
RoBERTaLARGE layer 21
(h) Deductions coloured at
RoBERTaLARGE layer 21
Figure 7: Layer-wise 2D t-SNE plots of pooled contextualized embeddings of the TaxiNLI examples extracted
from BERT and RoBERTA finetuned on MNLI with no retraining on the taxonomic labels. Color codes represent
taxonomic categories (inset shows NLI categories: entailment ( ), neutral ( ), contradiction ( )) and their
combinations. Only combinations of up to two categories are included for brevity.
do the systems simply lack the understanding of
what kind of reasoning is required per example,
or despite understanding that, are unable to do the
reasoning? 3) Can we make an argument for fu-
ture work and model architecture that can more
consciously use this information?
In light of recent probing task literature (Tenney
et al., 2019a; Jawahar et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019a),
we specifically investigate whether representations
of examples cluster meaningfully into taxonomic
categories relevant to the reasoning required for
NLI. We use the t-SNE (Maaten and Hinton, 2008)
algorithm to visualize pooled contextualized rep-
resentations of NLI examples, under the lens of
our taxonomy. For an NLI example, we construct
the embeddings at a Transformer layer by max-
pooling hidden states over all input token positions
concatenated with the [CLS] token (typically used
for classification tasks) representation. The result-
ing visualizations (Fig. 7) reveal definitive patterns
of clustering by taxonomic categories. The earli-
est separation is observed for the lexical cate-
gory, at layer 3 in BERT (and layer 1 in RoBERTa),
much before any other categories are realized. At
layers 6 in BERT, and 19 in RoBERTa, about the
same time as clustering by NLI label is seen, the
connectives cluster is revealed. The deductions
(see Sec. 2), and syntactic categories are re-
vealed in later layers (layer 11 and 12 in BERT
and layer 21 in RoBERTa). The knowledge cate-
gory is revealed more prominently in RoBERTa at
layer 21, while BERT does not seem to show such
a cluster. By the last few layers, separation into
most categories becomes apparent. This means,
along various layers of a NLI finetuned language
model, taxonomic information is implicitly cap-
tured. Despite this, as discussed in the previous
sections, SOTA models seem to be deficient in
some of the categories—certain categories remain
harder to perform inference on. In the latter lay-
ers, the separation along taxonomic categories also
corresponds strongly with separation along NLI
labels. For instance, in Fig. 7 (c), the examples cat-
egorized as syntactic almost entirely lie in the
entailment cloud, which matches our intuition
based on the statstics in Fig. 3.
The layer-wise separation of examples by tax-
onomy raises an interesting possibility to motivate
model architectures that may attempt to use its
discriminative power to identify such taxonomic
categories, for specialized treatment to examples
requiring certain reasoning capabilities.
Recasting: The under-representation of certain
categories in the MNLI dataset raises a need for
more balanced data collection. A possible alterna-
tive is to build recast diagnostic datasets for each
category, and create probing tasks. Some datasets
(Zhang et al., 2019; Richardson et al., 2020) can
be recast to the syntactic and Logical cat-
egories respectively, as their data creation aligns
with our category definitions. However, most cate-
gories lack such aligned synthetic data, and crowd-
sourced data would require manual annotation as
above. This poses an avenue for future work.
6 Conclusion
To bridge the gap between accuracy-led perfor-
mance measurement and linguistic analysis of state-
of-the-art NLI systems, we propose a taxonomic
categorization of necessary inferencing capabilities
for the NLI task, and a re-evaluation framework of
systems on a re-annotated NLI dataset using this
categorization; which underscores the reasoning
categories that current systems struggle with.
We would like to emphasize that unlike the case
with challenge and adversarial datasets, TAXINLI
re-annotates samples from existing NLI datasets
which the SOTA models have been exposed to.
Therefore, a lower accuracy in certain taxonomic
categories in this case cannot be simply explained
away by the “lack of data” and “unnatural distribu-
tion” arguments.
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A Other Categorizations
ANLI Inference Types GLUE Diagnostic
Lexical
Standard Inference
Lexical Inference
Lexical Entailment
Morphological Negation
Factivity, Redundancy
Syntactic Tricky
Syntactic Ambiguity,
Prepositional Phrase
Alternations: Active/Passive,
Genitives/Partitives,
Nominalization, Datives
Semantic
Standard Inference
Propositional Structure,
Intersectivity
Quantifiers, Restrictivity,
Quantification
Numerical,
Quantitative
Counting
Reference and Names
Symmetry/Collectivity,
Coreference, Richer
Logical Structures
Reference and Names
Reasoning about Facts
Named Entities
Knowledge and
Commonsense
Pragmatics Tricky Ellipsis/Implicits
Table 4: We show existing NLI error-analysis cate-
gorizations proposed by the recent papers, and group
them in higher-level categories.
B Bayesian Estimate of Correctness
Correlation with Categories
Since, examples are annotated with multiple cate-
gories, we capture the dependencies by defining a
Bayesian Network (BN) where, each category (a
boolean random variable) has a directed edge to
the correct node (representing correctness of pre-
diction)6. We learn the parameters by fitting this
BN to the observed data. In Figure 9, we see from
the Bayesian estimate again that, the improvements
by BERT in categories such as relational rea-
soning has been low. It also shows, that there is
a sharp decrease in accuracy for examples requir-
ing the use of taxonomic knowledge. However,
RoBERTa improves over NB and ESIM by large
margins, albeit non-uniformly.
C Factor Analysis of Correctness of
Prediction by RoBERTa
In Fig. 9, we show the results of Linear Discrimi-
nant Analysis (LDA) and Linear Regression (LR)
results for RoBERTa predictions. A very similar
trend as BERT can be seen here as well.
6Additionally, we attempted to learn a Bayes Net from
the data using bnlearn package. But the limited number of
observations yield non-intuitive results.
Figure 8: We show a Bayesian Estimate of
P (correct = 1|category = 1) for different sys-
tems.
D Annotation Questionnaire
Our annotation process went through several steps
of refinement and improvement. We started with
the most basic annotation flow, which was to have
a manual which defines each taxonomic category
in detail, and then have the annotator mark for each
category. For the pilot study, we took roughly 300
examples from MNLI and asked an initial annotator
to annotate. The feedback was the following:
• The manual describing each taxonomic cate-
gory had a lot of information and took time to
understand and digest.
• It was difficult to keep referring to the guide,
although after sufficient examples, it became
easier.
• There was confusion and ambiguity about the
definitions, and the annotator interpreted the
definitions differently than what we intended.
• Figuring out the categorical annotations for
neutral examples was a challenge, as some-
times the topic or subject of what the hypothe-
sis was discussing was separate from what the
premise was discussing.
Through the analysis of these annotations, we also
observed that some of the initial categories we had
were either exceedingly underrepresented in the
MNLI dataset, or were consistently confused with
others. Thus, we revised the set of categories, set-
ting more distinct boundaries, and ensuring inde-
pendence of categories. We revised the question-
naire into a hierarchical ’if-else’ multi-choice de-
sign. The questionnaire is structured as follows:
Figure 9: Coefficients obtained through Linear Dis-
criminant Analysis (LDA) and Logistic Regression
(LR) to model the correctness of NLI prediction
by RoBERTa, given taxonomy categories and pos-
sible confound variables. Significant LR coeffi-
cients: lexical**, negation***, world***,
quantifier*, boolean*, Length1*; where p
value is smaller than: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*.
D.0.1 Questionnaire 1
“We present you with a set of statements. Statement
1 (S1) is the truth and context. Statement 2 (S2) is a
claim/hypothesis. The task is to evaluate statement
2 as true, false, can’t say.
S1: ... S2: ...
1. Can you evaluate S2 by just using the informa-
tion/context given in S1? Or do you require
knowledge from external documents, say his-
tory books, news articles, science books, etc.?
(a) Need more information
(b) Do not need more information
2. If yes, what kind of information did you re-
quire? (More than one answer can be ticked)
(a) Knowledge about certain facts from say
history books, news articles, tech maga-
zines, etc.? This is also knowledge about
named entities (e.g. Obama, Taj Mahal,
New York etc.). E.g:
• S1: Barack Obama lived in the White
House during 2009-17.
• S2: Barack Obama was the President
in 2009.
This is TRUE and requires external
knowledge that US presidents live in the
White House.
(b) Knowledge about taxonomies and hierar-
chies. A few examples are animal groups
(snakes are reptiles), currencies (dollar is
a currency), types of activities (football
is a sport, sport is an activity). Basically,
how a common noun (snake) belongs to a
class (say reptiles), which can belong to
yet another class (animals). Do not select
this if the name of one object belongs (or
is a substring) of the other class of ob-
jects (e.g. green snake is a snake isn’t
part of this category), or if the names of
the objects are pronouns (e.g. Barack
Obama - president and related examples
are part of category 2a, not this one). E.g:
• S1: Norman hated all musical instru-
ments.
• S2: Norman loves the piano.
This is FALSE and requires external
knowledge that a piano belongs to the
class of instruments, hence Norman can-
not love the piano.
(c) No extra knowledge required
3. Using just the information from S1, and given
that you have the required knowledge from
the above question, did you have to use some
reasoning to figure out the answer, or did you
just need the knowledge of words and para-
phrasing, or both? (More than one can be
ticked)
(a) Some reasoning was required, which
wasn’t explicitly written down in S1, but
was implicitly understood.
(b) Knowledge of words (e.g. synonyms,
antonyms), and recognizing paraphrases.
The information I needed was explicitly
written down in S1.
4. What kind of reasoning was required (if appli-
cable) (More than one can be ticked)?
(a) You needed reasoning about relations in
S1. You observed that there were ob-
jects/entities in S1 and there were ex-
plicit mentions of how they were related
(e.g. Jack and his son went to the circus),
and you used your reasoning about the
nature of those relations to arrive to the
answer (e.g. Jack and a stranger went to
the circus is FALSE) E.g:
• S1: Jack and his son went to the cir-
cus.
• S2: Jack and a stranger went to the
circus.
This is FALSE, but you need to reason
that S1 contains the relation “father of”
between Jack and some person X (who
is his son). S2 is false because if X is a
stranger, it cannot be Jack’s son.
(b) You needed reasoning about spatial setup.
S1 contained information about relative
locations of objects/entities (e.g. Jack
was on the right of Jim, and Jim was
on the right of John) and you needed to
reason about how objects/entities were
located, when it wasn’t explicitly stated
(e.g. John was on the left of Jack is
TRUE).
(c) You needed reasoning about time inter-
vals, duration, or temporal reasoning. S1
contained information about events and
time information (e.g. Jack went to the
shop from 8:00am to 10:00am), and you
needed to reason about the timing to ar-
rive at the answer (e.g. Jack was at the
shop at 9:30am is TRUE).
(d) You needed reasoning about cause, ef-
fect, and intent behind it. S1 contained
information about an event or an action
(e.g. Jack was hurt). S2 contains either
a cause or an intent, and you needed to
reason whether S1 and S2 were possi-
ble cause/effect or intent/effect pairs (e.g.
Jack was hit by a car is CAN’T SAY)
• S1: X shot Y
• S2: Y is hurt
This is TRUE, but you needed to reason
that upon getting shot, Y should get hurt.
(e) You needed to be able to reason about
who is being referred to in the text. Better
demonstrated via example:
• S1: Jane didn’t visit Janette because
she didn’t want to speak with her.
• S2: Jane didn’t want to speak with
Janette.
This is TRUE. ‘She’ refers to Jane, and
you needed to reason about that to get
the answer.
5. Did you need logical reasoning? This ap-
plies if S1 and/or S2 consist of statements
connected by logical connective words (and,
or, not, every, some, only, either, neither, etc.
or any synonyms of these words). These con-
nectives were important for arriving at the
answer. If so, which connectives? (Can tick
multiple choices)
(a) Negation (not, no, incapable etc.), where
S2 negates one of the facts in S1. E.g:
• S1: Laurie has visited Nephi, Marion
has only visited Calistoga.
• S2: Laurie didn’t visit Nephi.
This is FALSE, and S2 is a negation of
the first statement in S1.
(b) Boolean (or, and), where S1 is a set of
statements connected by Or and AND,
and S2 talks about one or more of these
statements. E.g:
• S1: Jar Jar Binks, R2D2 and Padme
only visited Anakin’s house.
• S2: Jar Jar Binks didn’t visit
Anakin’s shop.
This is TRUE, and S1 is connected by
‘and’ statements for three entities who
visited Anakin’s house. S2 talks about
the sub-statement “Jar Jar Binks only vis-
ited Anakin’s house” in the ‘and’ connec-
tive, and it is true because Jar Jar Binks
didn’t visit anywhere else.
(c) Quantifier (every, some, at least, at most,
etc.), where S1 and S2 contain the use of
these terms.
• S1: Everyone visited Anakin’s home.
• S2: Padme didn’t visit Anakin’s
home.
This is FALSE, with S1 containing the
quantifier ‘everyone’, and S2 stating that
someone, Padme, didn’t visit.
(d) Conditionals (if-else, if-then, etc.),
where S1 has if-then, if-else statements
or similar.
• S1: Francisco has visited Potsdam
and if Francisco has visited Potsdam
then Tyrone has visited Pampa.
• S2: Tyrone has visited Pampa
This is TRUE, since there is a if-then
condition in S1, and it is satisfied to make
S2 true.
(e) Comparatives (e.g. as tall as, taller than,
faster than, etc.) where S1 compares en-
tities via these comparative phrases, and
S2 needs knowledge about the compar-
isons.
• S1: John is taller than Gordon and
Erik, and Mitchell is as tall as John
• S2: Gordon is taller than Mitchell.
This is FALSE. This are comparative
statements “Is taller than” in S1, and S2
needs logical reasoning on who is taller
than whom to get S2. In addition to this,
this also needs knowledge of Boolean
due to the presence of the ‘and’ in S1.
6. Finally, can you describe some word/phrase
(explicitly written) properties of S1 and S2
which helped to arrive to the answer? (more
than one can be ticked)
(a) S1 and S2 were almost the same, apart
from the removal, addition, or substitu-
tion of a few words. If substituted, the
words were synonyms or antonyms. E.g:
• S1: Anakin Skywalker was compas-
sionate.
• S2: Anakin Skywalker was cruel.
This is FALSE, with S1 and S2 be-
ing very similarly framed statements,
with the substitution of a word for it’s
antonym. Thus it belongs to this cate-
gory.
(b) S1 and S2 were paraphrases of each other.
S2 is a paraphrase of S1 or a certain part
of information mentioned in S1
• S1: Anakin was an excellent pilot.
• S2: The piloting skills of Anakin
were excellent.
This is TRUE, and S1 and S2 being para-
phrases of one another. Also, to note, if
‘excellent’ in S2 were replaced by ‘terri-
ble’, it would still fit this category, but
would also fit category 6a, since it would
be a paraphrase with a swapped word.
(c) S2 contains an assumed fact from S1,
mostly an assumption about the exis-
tence or the occurrence of an action.
• S1: Anakin found the Death Star.
• S2: The Death Star exists.
This is TRUE. The Death Star exists if
Anakin has found it, thus S1 makes the
assumption that it exists.
• S1: James was happy that his plane
could fly.
• S2: His plane couldn’t fly.
This is FALSE. Since James was happy
that the plane flew (S1 makes the assump-
tion that it happened), it is FALSE that
his plane couldn’t fly since it happened.”
The above questionnaire was given along with
premise-hypothesis pairs having the gold label of
‘entailment’ or ‘contradiction’ . However, to pre-
vent biasing the annotator, we allowed them to
choose ‘neutral’ (CAN’T SAY) as well.
D.0.2 Questionnaire 2
This questionnaire was given to the annotators af-
ter they had done a sufficient number of ‘entail-
ment/contradiction’ samples using Questionnaire 1.
For Questionnaire 2, annotators were told that the
datapoints were ‘neutral’, and asked them to first
answer these 3 questions:
“Given S1, there isn’t enough information to de-
cide whether S2 is TRUE or FALSE. Please answer
the following questions for each datapoint which
has been annotated as CAN’T SAY.
1. Are S1 and S2 talking about the same general
topic (e.g. sports, politics, religion)? [Yes/No]
2. If yes, are S1 and S2 talking about the same
subject? (e.g. S1: Obama was the president
of USA, S2: Obama was a nice guy, subject
of sentence is Obama) [Yes/No]
3. If yes, are S1 and S2 talking about the same
objects of discussion? (e.g. S1: Obama lived
in the White House often, S2: Obama said
the White House was huge. Here both subject
(Obama) and object (White House) of discus-
sion are the same)
4. If yes, what kinds of information are required
which you used, and what kinds of informa-
tion are missing? If no, what kinds of infor-
mation are required which you used, and what
kinds of information are missing? ”
Upon answering the above, if the answer to the
second question was yes, then they proceeded with
the category annotation, else they moved on to the
next question. This helped eliminate the random
hypotheses.
D.0.3 Annotator Feedback
We received a lot of important feedback from our
annotators during the clarification and training ses-
sions. They are listed below:
• Many premise sentences seems out of place,
and the context is still insufficient many times.
As a result, the hypothesis also introduces
ambiguity, making the process a bit tricky.
• There were cases where a certain name of
an entity in the premise is switched for some-
thing else in the hypothesis. This created some
confusion because it fell somewhere between
lexical and coreference (according to the an-
notator).
• Another confusion arose from the quantifier
category, where initially the name of the cat-
egory led the annotators to believe that it
referred to not just what we described (e.g.
some, all), but quantities (say 5000 in the
premise was swapped with 2000 in the hy-
pothesis). This was again a middle ground
between lexical and quantifier.
• Many of the premises contained incoherent,
difficult to understand sentences. A lot of
premises (which we later found to be from
the telephone category), contained many filler
words (uh, uhm, etc.) which made compre-
hension difficult.
• Another issue lies with an implicit rigidity of
the annotation process using just the question-
naire. The targeted questions were written so
as to allow annotators to generalize and ap-
ply intuitive principles along those thought
lines that we try to demarcate via the ques-
tions. We wanted to prevent them completely
However, as annotators have not been exposed
to the exact intentions behind the annotation
(so as to prevent bias), they followed the ques-
tionnaire strictly, and did not always general-
ize until subsequent training/clarification ses-
sions where we encouraged them to general-
ize. However, the implicit rigidity still im-
pacts the annotations to some extent, although
mitigated to a large level by the training. This
remains a challenge due to the tradeoff be-
tween open interpretation of the task, as well
as a rigidity of desired annotations which stem
from an analysis perspective (from our side).
• Idiomatic references, metaphors, and common
phrases were also a source of confusion, and
although to some extent were marked as world
knowledge, did leave annotators unsure about
where to place them.
The above feedback only strengthened our belief in
an iterative training system for a complicated task
such as this. It also sheds light on how difficult a
task like this is to crowdsource.
